VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS

CRIME INVESTIGATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION OF INVESTIGATORS AND PROSECUTORS

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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The safety of a society, by way of getting all necessary arrangements for unfailing protection and preservation of individual’s liberty and rights relating to his/her person and property, is the fundamental goal of criminal justice, and for this reason it has been regarded as an indispensable system of peace and order. In achieving this goal, the criminal justice system uses multi-pronged processes—investigation prosecution, and adjudication which exist as independent jurisdictions but function as one ‘integrated system.’ The final outcome appears in one of the two forms—i.e. either the suspect is declared ‘guilty’ or he/she is ‘innocent’. The criminal justice system by application of this process, reaching the state of conviction and making the offender subjected to a system of punishment, functions as an effective instrument of ‘deterring potential offenders’, thus guaranteeing an effective system of preventing transgression in person or property of one individual by other individual.1

Looking from this pragmatic point of view,2 the criminal justice system in a society, which generally holds the faith on democratic function of the State and affirms a deeply rooted trust in principle of the inalienability of fundamental rights of individuals, resolutely and meticulously follows some principles as ‘indispensable or inevitable’ components for building a worthy criminal justice system.3 These principles are (a) the corpus delicti4 is the primary fact and evidence for driving the process of justice to a dependable conclusion, and the corpus delicti is identified by way of resorting to the process of scientific examination or inquest of the crime scene; (b) the relation between corpus delicti and the offender is established by the scientific examination or scrutiny of the objects, exhibits or traces found in the crime scene; (c) the analysis of evidence is carried out for generating reasoning for appropriate indictment leading to the prosecution; and (d) the relation between the corpus delicti and the law is established, thus the authenticity, reasonability and validity of reason is confirmed.

The criminal justice system follows a ‘systematically designed course of action in its operation’, and this course of action is guided by certain other inevitable principles. These principles5 are (a) the fairness in all aspects of procedure; (b) the impartiality in attitude of applying procedures; and (c) the use of judicial mind while adopting decisions or interpreting findings. Failure to consider these principles will necessarily result in violation of the fair trial. The principles of fairness and impartialities in criminal proceedings are taken as two important attributes of the criminal justice system of a

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2The criminal justice system is considered more effective and functional if it is able to achieve its goal of bringing the offenders into the notice of justice, and make no mistake by punishing an innocent person. The punishment to the offender is considered essential viewing the peace and tranquility in the society. Hence, no society can see the criminal justice system merely as a ‘institution of state to exercise power to discipline the people’. For more philosophical deliberation See; Ibid.


4The phrase corpus delicti means the physical object upon which the crime was committed, such as dead body, or the charred remains of a house. The corpus delicti can also be used to describe the evidence that proves that a crime has been committed. See; West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc.
democratic society. These two components represent ‘the concept of rule of law’ in the context of criminal justice. The fairness and impartiality, in turn, require due attention for application or operation of the several other principles relating the procedure, which not only make the criminal justice system in that society properly functional but also make its result duly credible and trustworthy. These principles are (a) that the burden of proof lies on the prosecutors so that the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; (b) that the right of a suspect to acquire adequate and competent legal defense by professional representation is fully guaranteed, which includes the right to an interpreter in the case if he/she does not understand the language in which the charge has been put forth; (c) no suspect can be pressed to confess that he/she has committed crime and thus use of coercion or deceptive interrogation for extraction of confession renders the same as inadmissible evidence; (d) a suspect must be presumed innocent until the concerned judicial authority has declared him/her guilty; and (e) no suspect can be charged twice for the same crime, so that an arrest and detention made under such circumstance will make such arrest and detention illegal and improper.

These principles plainly and adequately deny an argument, which is so common in most developing countries, that ‘criminal justice is a State’s instrument to justify the coercive actions’. This looming misconception that the ‘criminal justice system is an instrument of State for coercing citizens to abide by rules of law and order’ is a central problem of the fairness and impartiality in the criminal proceeding in developing countries. The misconception gives rise to the following serious problems destroying the positive impression of the general public to the criminal justice system:

a. The police machinery in the developing societies generally takes criminal justice system as a ‘police power’ of the State; hence, no rights can be claimed by suspects who have been booked for suspicion of committing crimes. This assumption of police machinery does give a false impression to the investigators that ‘a suspect or accused’ is an enemy to the State. Such a psychology among investigators not only destroys the prospect of the fairness and impartiality in the investigation process, but also maligns the prospect of a suspect’s human rights protection. This unwanted psychology is accountable to engendering a host of problems within the criminal justice systems of developing countries. Most problems of torture are associated with this feigned psychology.

b. The investigator becomes psychologically obsessed to consider that ‘the person who is a suspect or accused’ is the matter of central importance in investigation. Explicably, the ‘investigation of the fact and relevant evidence’ does not make the centerpiece of investigation work. The total concentration of the investigator, therefore, is likely to be driven to extract confession, thus indiscrately disorienting the investigator from culling forensic, toxicological, and serological and other material evidence.

c. In most developing countries, another saddening psychology, which is based on the misconception too, is that the work of crime investigation is related to an inherent power of the police

5 There are allegations that the Anglo-American adversarial system has adopted pro-defendant procedures, and occasionally it is claimed that this system has increased the crime rate (See: Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty & The “Innocent”: An Examination Of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 523 n.30, 1999. However, a philosophical justification to this system is that ‘the social cost of false or wrong conviction is far greater than the privileges given to the defendant facing the trial’. For additional discourse in this regard See: Keith N. Hylton and Vikramaditya S. Khanna, “Towards Economic Theory of Pro-defendant Criminal Procedure”, Boston University School of Law, Working Paper Series Index, <http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers>.


8 The right to an interpreter is a human right under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.

9 Torture of any form has been prohibited by the Convention against Torture as well as constitutions of democratic countries. As such unacceptability of torture and similar practices have emerged as an important principle of fair trial.
institution. This psychology brings a notion of thinking in police that police officers must be allowed to carry out investigation independently, i.e., without interference or guidance of any other institution. This notion of thinking and belief is a greater source of argument on the part of the police investigator that ‘the act of arrest, detention and interrogation’ are exclusive privileges of the police institution. The truth is that a police officer, when he/she is acting as an investigator, is not working in the capacity of ‘the police officer’, as a law enforcer, but as a ‘researcher and scientist’. The power and function as a researcher is ‘power and function’ of the investigator under the law, so that his position as a patrolling or law enforcing officer has nothing to do with the power and function he/she is supposed to entertain as an investigating officer. The power and function of the police officer as an investigator ‘is a power and function’ associated with the realm of justice but not with the realm of law enforcement.

d. The responsibility of ‘proving the guilt’ unequivocally lies on the prosecutor, and the prosecutor, thus, has to discharge this responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. The responsibility is carried out with the strength of ‘evidence’ that determine the ‘nature of corpus delicti’ and ‘the objective or factual relation between the corpus delicti and the suspect’. Analogically speaking, the investigation of crime, to look from this context, is an empirical research purported to generate data for the prosecution of the offence. Explicably, an investigation is a part of the prosecution that generates evidence required. Obviously, the need for investigators working under the guidance of prosecutors is inevitable. The notion of thinking that an act of investigation is ‘independent from prosecutors and, rather, is an independent function of police institution’ is thus a stumbling block in the success of prosecution in many developing countries.10

II. EFFICIENT COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE AND CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The brief discourse, above, emphatically highlights the significance of evidence for successful prosecution which conspicuously underlies its importance for the conviction of offenders and the protection of the innocent. The importance of evidence in criminal proceedings is thus crucial not only because ‘it helps the criminal justice machinery to achieve conviction of offenders with proper penal sanction but also because it prevents an innocent from being victimized’. Each aspect reinforces the other resolutely and, consequently, engenders a wider public credulity to the system of administration of justice in that given society. Understandably, the efficiency in culling proper and concrete evidence enables the ‘criminal justice system of a given society’ to fulfill two major objectives as a civilized society. Firstly, it achieves a goal of preserving the safety of the given society by protecting innocents from being victimized. Secondly, it achieves the goal of deterring potential offenders by punishing the wrongdoers. These two goals fairly adequately indicate to the types of ‘evidence’ the prosecutors are supposed to explore. It is also evident from the goal of protecting the innocent that ‘no evidence culled by the investigator’ can be dubious, doubtful, or unreliable. The goal of convicting the offender also demands that the evidence the prosecutors have culled must be undubious, undoubtful and fully reliable. The efficiency relating to evidence collection is thus philosophically related with the ultimate goal of the safety of the society the criminal justice system is to achieve.

A. Some Devastating Challenges to the Efficient Collection of Evidence in Developing Countries

The criminal justice systems in developing countries are, however, facing serious challenges in order to smoothly achieve these goals, mainly due to the ‘lack clarity about the concept of criminal justice system itself’. Some misconceptions discussed above do fairly adequately indicate to these challenges. More detailed discourse on some of them, to follow hereinafter, will make the understanding more tangible. The main challenge, however, is the looming insensitivity in the concerned stakeholders of the criminal justice system in developing countries towards the need of transforming the criminal justice system from a coercive apparatus of the State into ‘human rights protection machinery’. The tendency of refuting the principle among the stakeholders of the criminal justice system in the developing countries is extensive. Owing to this insensitivity and the looming tendency of indifference to the modernization of the system among the stakeholders of the criminal justice, the

10 Much in this regard has been discussed in the article entitled “Comparative Survey of Investigation Systems in China, India, Japan and Nepal: Some Challenges and Best Practices”.
following problems are bound to arise, thus hindering the process of efficient collection of evidence:

B. Notional or Theoretical Misunderstanding about ‘Powers and Privileges’ Concerning Investigation of Crime

It is a general understanding among the investigators, the prosecutors and the larger section of legal intelligentsia in the developing countries that the power of ‘crime investigation’ is inherently associated with the policing institution of the State, and as such the belief that crime investigation is a crime control mechanism rather than an instrument of fair and impartial justice is widespread. As a result, the tendency of using means of coercive and deceptive interrogation, as an inevitable instrument of crime investigation, for extracting confession is phenomenally practiced in the developing countries. The root cause of this tendency lies on the misconception of the police institution that the function of crime investigation is a function inherently associated with the police power of the State. The resistance of the police officers, who generally occupy the authority concerning crime investigation, to take the ‘function of crime investigation, as a tool of collecting evidence for fair and impartial prosecution leading to adjudication of the offence’, is implausibly stronger. Of course, the function of crime investigation does contribute, as an essential component of preventing crimes by locating the offenders, to the mission of crime control, but the core objective of the function of the crime investigation is to help in enhancing and fostering the course of fair trial by generating adequate and reliable evidence for the trustworthy and dependable prosecution of alleged offenders. However, the misconception looming large in the police institutions as well as the other stakeholders of the criminal justice system that ‘the crime investigation is an inherent power and special privilege of the police institution’ poses a serious hindrance in fostering necessary cooperation between the prosecutors and the investigators, especially for the purpose of collecting adequate, objective and reliable evidence. Owing to this misconception, the tendency of the crime investigators in developing countries to work in isolation from prosecutors is a widespread problem.

Hence, what the tendency and claims generally found among the crime investigators is that they should be allowed to act, by all means and mechanisms, to investigate the criminal acts independently as a prerogative of the police officer or institution. With no doubt, the police investigators, for the meaningful enforcement of criminal justice system in any society, have a key role to play. The crime investigators are explicitly placed in a key position to handle criminals, so that they have powers to arrest suspects, detain them and conduct interrogation. The investigator can use innumerable techniques, methods and equipment to reveal the thread of criminal acts. The responsibility of the investigator to cull evidence for conviction of the accused is thus vital and indispensable. But in no sense, it can be established that his/her work will yield good results without coordination and cooperation of the prosecutor.

To realize this responsibility of the prime importance in criminal justice, the crime investigators are supposed to discharge the duties of (a) ascertaining facts and circumstances that are associated with, and relevant to, the act of crime, the corpus delicti, (b) apprehending suspects and obtaining necessary information regarding the corpus delicti, (c) collating evidence, oral or documentary, or direct or circumstantial, that is so necessary or vital for the prosecutors to discharge the onus of proof, (d) exercising the police power of the state in order to conduct search and seizure for the purpose of collating evidence, and (e) preserving the witness and evidence to be used by the prosecutors to ensure conviction of the offender, and prevent the innocent from being penalized. It is here necessary to consciously gauge the nature of work the investigator is supposed to carry out. Undoubtedly, the certain power exercised by investigators is associated with the ‘police power of the State’, which enables them to legally encroach upon some freedoms or liberty of alleged suspects or accused which in other circumstances is not allowed. Nevertheless, the power so used by investigators is neither a ‘power nor authority’ belonging to the police institution, nor can it be exercised by an investigator by simply being a police officer. The power essentially belongs to the ‘officer who is designated by law as the investigator of the crime’,11 The misconception that ‘crime investigation’ is a power of police officer is a ‘key problem’ behind many faults and failures in achieving the goal of collating effective and meaningful evidence.

This said misconception is a deadly cause for massive failure of prosecution in Nepal and other developing countries. This misconception emphasizes division of function between ‘investigator as a
police and prosecutor as an accusing lawyer of the State’. Hence, the investigation process is detached from prosecutorial supervision and monitoring. As an outcome of the ‘misconception’, the function of investigation is considered by the ‘investigator’ as a technical function of the police officers, so that the engagement or involvement of the prosecutor is considered not only unnecessary but also undesirable—the involvement of the prosecutor, in fact, is considered to be interference in the function of investigation. This misconception is thus a stumbling block in ways of effective investigation and efficient collection of evidence.

No need to explain that the investigation is a part of prosecution. To be precise, the necessity of investigation may have no place if there is no prosecution is required. A meaningful prosecution is undoubtedly ‘contingent’ upon the successful accomplishment of the investigation work. Accuracy of findings of the probe of corpus delicti, the examination of the pieces of evidence associated with and the legality thereof are certain important aspects of investigation. The accuracy of the findings of the probe of corpus delicti is, undeniably and without any exception, governed by the ‘science, technology and technical skills of the investigator, whereas the legality of evidence is always protected and ensured by the unflailing supervising investigator, prosecutors, instructions for obtaining credible evidence and oversight of the fairness and impartiality of the prosecutor. The functional coordination between investigator and prosecutor during the entire process of the investigation is thus a vital and relentless process. Any failure in coordination between these two authorities or agencies is bad for the society, as well as the liberty of individuals.12 The assertion here implies that ‘the investigator during his/her performance is necessarily associated with the prosecutor, and is constantly guided by him/her’.13 This cooperation is, however, broken or not practiced in most of the developing countries, which constitutes one of the serious causes of miscarriage of justice.

What are the rationales behind such cooperation between investigators and prosecutors? The justification is self-evident. The administration of criminal justice brings up an offender to the notice of appropriate justice, thereby rules out the prospect of random reprisal against people and an innocent is being penalized. As already discussed before, the administration of criminal justice functions within the bounds of concrete ‘principles and normative standards’. The suspect or accused is presumed to be innocent until he/she has been proved committing the offence beyond reasonable doubt. This principle requires the ‘prosecutor’ to discharge the resolute and absolute onus of proof. Now it is evident why an investigator is so desperately obliged to work in collaboration with prosecutor while collecting evidence. In other words, the main reason behind the collaboration is to ensure that the prosecution is founded on ‘undoubtful, undoubted and reliable’ evidence. Who is the investigator, a police officer generally, working for? Definitely not for his/her institution—the police department. He/she is working for the sake of the prosecutor, who has a legal duty to charge the alleged person. This

11 For instance, the State Cases Act, 1992 (2049) of Nepal specifically requires a police officer to be duly designated as an investigating officer before he/she takes charge of an investigating officer. His/her authority of investigation is generated by the ‘State Cases Act, which underlies the procedure of criminal proceeding. The authority of the investigating officer is, in no way, a power of police officer entrusted by the Police Act of the country. As the State Cases Act plainly provides that an act of investigation is to be carried out by a ‘designated’ police officer as ‘investigator’, no other police officers or the institution can interfere in the process of conducting enquiry or the process of evidence collection. Being a police officer is, thus, not ‘enough’. The prevailing law in Nepal explicitly requires that the officer is to be recognized as an “investigator” by law itself. The proceeding of investigation is thus valid only if such proceeding is carried out by the designated investigator. Similar provisions are found provided by the Criminal Procedure Code of India, 1973. According to Section 204 (1b), to be read together with Section 87, the magistrate, taking cognizance of the offence, can issue a warrant for arrest of the suspect. The warrant for arrest is a written order for arrest of the suspect. Such warrant is signed and issued by the magistrate, and addressed to the concerned police officer. Seemingly, the provision implies that the power of investigation carried out by the police officer is a ‘power related to the delivery of justice’. It is in no way a police power of the State.


13 Some research in Nepal, such as the Baseline Survey of Criminal Justice System, CeLRRd, 2002, the Comprehensive Analysis and Reforms of the Criminal Justice System of Nepal, CeLRRd, 1999, National Survey of Criminal Justice System, 2012 and dozens of research articles contributed by experts have established that the ‘cooperation between investigator and prosecutor in Nepal is feeble giving rise to massive failure of prosecution. See, for ratio of success and failure of prosecution, the Annual Reports of the Office of the Attorney General. For the Fiscal Year of 2067 (2011) and 2068 (2012).
framework of the administration of criminal justice, in the societies that have opted to operate with adversarial systems, demands that ‘the investigator has to collate such evidence which are mandatory to prove the guilt of the offender’. Nothing more or less than that is required from the investigator. However, there are serious problems in this regard. The following instances from Nepal will illustrate the viciousness of the problem:

- Section 6(2) of the State Cases Act, 1993, stipulates the Government Attorney, who is to handle the case, to provide required instructions to the investigators, upon acquiring the ‘preliminary report on investigation’. The preliminary report, in practice, however, contains no objective information on corpus delicti and other associated facts, scene of crime, and possible relevant evidence. This report is submitted just for the sake of formality, and hence asks for no kind of instruction from the prosecutor that is supposed to be carried out. The investigator instantaneously takes up his/her work without any consultation in advance with prosecutors, the government attorney. Obviously, the process of collecting evidence starts without prior knowledge of what the prosecutor is looking for.14

- Section 7(5) also requires the investigator to seek advice or instruction from the prosecutor in connection with the scene of the crime, which includes preparation of documents such as the crime scene report, and concerning documents or exhibits found at the crime scene. This practice is totally non-existent too. It also shows that the investigation follows or progresses in total indifference of the prosecutor’s concerns or needs.15

- Section 9(1) requires the police to record deposition of the suspect in presence of the prosecutor, but this provision is hardly followed in accordance with its true spirit, which intends to prevent circumstances leading to misuse of the authority by the investigating officer. In most cases, the prosecutor signs the deposition falsely stating the deposition was recorded in his or her presence. Some improvements in this regard are seen after a series of sensitization training activities, yet the situation is still unchanged.

- Section 15(1) has a clear prohibition on detention beyond 24 hours after arrest except remand from the judicial authority taking cognizance of the offence. However, the prosecutor is hardly informed of the process of remand. The investigator alone approaches the trial court, without any information given to the prosecutor for the remand.16

- Section 17(1) requires the investigating officer to submit the detailed case file, along with his/her opinion, to the prosecutor once the process of investigation is considered completed by the investigating officer. The timeframe left for the prosecutor for the critical appraisals or understanding of the evidence is limited. Hence, the role of the prosecutor concludes by preparing a charge-sheet and attaching the documents or evidence submitted by the investigating officer.17

- The existing success rate of prosecution, including those cases tried by the Chief District Officer, an executive body, which has jurisdiction to try cases of gangsterism or vandalism, is around 70 percent.18 The chance of acquittal in such cases is very low. With this rate of failure in the court, we are forced to argue that either the criminal justice system is letting a considerably large number of offenders go scot free, or is falling in the trap of miscarriage of justice by placing a considerably large number of innocent persons in a state of unfounded prosecution.

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16 CeLRRd, n. 15.
17 CeLRRd, Analysis and Reforms of the Criminal Justice System of Nepal (a research report), Kathmandu, 1999.
What would result by absence of ‘cooperation and coordination’ between the crime investigators and prosecutors? The brief and candid answer would be ‘miscarriage’ of justice, and incessant rise of recidivism and the rate of crime. The ultimate victim of this situation is the ‘human rights of people’. The situation generates vicious circumstances of human rights violations and deterioration of the social safety respectively. The change in the situation is therefore not only desirable but also mandatory, provided that the criminal justice system has to be able to address its benign goals. Building or fostering efficiency for the collection of evidence is thus a vital or key concern of reforms of the criminal justice system in the developing countries, and this can be realized only by adopting the following strategic reform initiatives:

- The investigator must bring about changes in attitude by truly internalizing a principle that ‘his/her role as an investigator’ is unquestionably related to the societal need of delivering fair and impartial justice, but not the exercise of coercive police power. An investigator of crime is an agent of the criminal justice system but not a crime control or patrolling police officer. The crime investigator is an expert of exploring and culling evidence that determines the corpus delicti, ‘modus operandi’ of crime as well as linkage between the modus operandi of the crime and the alleged offender.

- The purpose or goal of the investigation is to procure evidence for sustainable prosecution. The sustainable prosecution is that which is supported by unquestionable, authentic and legitimate evidence. The responsibility of sustaining the prosecution definitely lies on the prosecutors through evidence collated by the investigators. The prosecutor is thus an expert of knowing the vitality of the evidence and its legality. He/she has thus right and responsibility to instruct the investigator on what kinds of evidence are required to sustain the claims put forth before the trial.

- It is now self-evident that the ‘investigator and prosecutor’ must work as a team rather than two independent institutions or officials. Their cooperation is necessary from the time the offence has taken place. The investigator is to collect evidence in accordance with the need of prosecuting the offence and sustaining it in the trial. For instance, if a person is found allegedly killed by poisoning, the prosecutor inevitably requires contents of poison in the blood of the deceased as proof that the death had occurred by poisoning. The post-mortem report may have concrete analysis of the cause of death if the autopsy-performer is so requested. The prosecutor has to instruct the investigator in this regard, and this would be possible if the prosecutor knows about details of the offence. The cooperation between investigator and prosecutor is thus the most fundamental modus operandi for exploring proofs for sustaining the charge.

- The evidence collected by the investigator needs to be scientifically and logically analyzed by the prosecutor, and here, again, the cooperation between the investigator and prosecutor is mandatory. The prosecutor has to draw reasoning for confirming the charge from evidence collected by the investigator. The involvement of the prosecutor in investigation is thus not only advisable but inevitable.

It now follows that ‘the workable modus operandi’ of the efficient evidence collection can only be developed by ensuring the ‘collaborative team work of the prosecutor and investigator’. The so-called institutional autonomy and independence between prosecutors and investigators is a serious problem facing the criminal justice system of the developing countries. The absence of collaboration and joint efforts in exploration of evidence destroys the prospect of culling dependable proofs for sustainable prosecution. This situation can be illustrated by the following examples:

- An investigator may not necessarily be a lawyer or person with legal expertise, and so he/she may not know the procedural requirements of collecting evidence, thereby committing a severe mistake concerning legality of the evidence. Hence, prosecutor’s involvement in investigation is mandatory for ensuring the legitimacy of the evidence. In developing countries, one serious reason for failure of the prosecution is the inadmissibility of the evidence caused by wrong procedure applied while collecting evidence. For instance, the collection of blood, semen,
saliva, and other fluids are collected without fulfilling the scientific procedures, thus rendering their legitimacy destroyed. This kind of mistake happens because the investigator and his/her subordinates may not have knowledge about ‘evidentiary value of the work they are doing’.

- The investigator may have been psychologically and obsessively influenced by the culpability or innocence of the suspect, and so the entire investigation process may be driven by his/her subjective belief. The evidence collected in such a situation may not have any relevance with the corpus delicti.

- The difference between ‘evidence and proof’ is vital. Evidence is particular, associated with a fact of crime or available at the crime scene, documents or exhibits. It is an object or a property of a phenomenon. Proof is an evidentiary value of the evidence. The proof is a reasoning on which the argument of prosecutor is to be founded on. The investigator may not be aware of such reasoning underlying the evidence. The prosecutor is an expert of drawing reasoning from evidence by ‘comparing the property of evidence with law’. In most developing countries the prosecutor is insensitive of drawing ‘proof for sustaining prosecution from’ evidence.

- To establish a linkage between the actus reus and mens rea is a vital function of the evidence, and this responsibility has to be discharged by the prosecutor. The investigator may not be concerned with the need of linking such relation. The investigator may be able to explore such evidence only by suggestion of the prosecutor.

Again, the instances discussed above abundantly shed light on the need of a joint work or collaboration of the prosecutor and investigator. This now leads us to conclude that ‘the vital aspect of efficient evidence collection’ process lies on the ‘active, engaged and cooperative participation of the investigator and the prosecutor in the process of exploring and analyzing the evidences’. The absence of such cooperation thus can be identified as a serious problem affecting the efficiency in collection of evidence.

C. Impact of Exaggerated Institutional Autonomy Versus Individual Professional Accountability

In most developing countries, institutional accountability is overridingly emphasized by both the ‘investigator and the prosecutor’. What it implies is that the ‘investigator’ and ‘prosecutors’ emphasize the pride and prejudice of their respective institutions. This attitude begets an ‘invisible but strong current of institutional competition for supremacy, if not rivalry, between the investigator and prosecutor. Both of them indulge in quests of ‘institutional autonomy’ rather than ‘professional participation or coordination’ in performance. An investigator considers him- or herself more a ‘member of police force’, and the ‘prosecutor’, a lawyer. The notion that prosecution is an agency for overseeing the investigation is largely sidelined. On the other hand, the investigator feels more accountable to ‘his institutional boss’ rather than the prosecutor. The result is an ‘invisible tug of war’ between two professionals. This attitudinal problem, which is crucially important in destroying the efficient modus operandi of the collection of evidence and thus resulting in failure of the prosecution, is largely caused by a misunderstanding about the ‘structure of the criminal justice system’, because most developing countries have transplanted the ‘administration of criminal justice from the former colonial masters’.

In the adversarial model, each agency of the criminal justice system is supposed to function within a framework of ‘institutional independence and functional interdependence’. Nevertheless, the notion of institutional independence cannot be considered as a license to function in isolation or disintegration of other agencies and disregard of the fundamental principles of justice. The institutional independence of each agency is understood as a guarantee of ‘its administrative autonomy’. This doctrine implies that the criminal justice system cannot stand as a disintegrated platform of various mutually unaccountable, scattered and disintegrated sub-systems. While each institution functions with its own designated authorities and responsibilities, the goal of all is to ensure fair and impartial dispensation of justice without jeopardizing the public safety. In developing countries, this doctrine is, however,

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largely upset by the attitude of overriding and exaggerated pride and prejudice of criminal justice actors.

The criminal justice system of an orderly and organized society is expected to function as ‘a composite and fully integrated system’. Any attempt to exclude or undermine any one of the components is not only unimaginable but also disastrous to the credulity of the entire system. The failure of any agency in its mission of carrying out the designated responsibility is bound to generate a state of malfunctioning of the entire system.20 The efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system is thus necessarily determined by an ‘active and coordinated performance of all agencies’. No desired result of the administration of the criminal justice system can be achieved without an active and smooth functionality of all agencies.21

A well-devised synchronism of functions of these various agencies is a device to activate this multi-pronged system towards its designated goal, and also forms a prerequisite for systematic and smooth functioning of the system. Thus, a functional criminal justice system is conceptually marked by two essentialities that (a) the functional independence of every agency is undeniable, and (b) an active and meaningful oversight or monitoring of functions of that agency by others is also undeniable. Failure to ensure independence of, and coordination between, the agencies of the criminal justice system is bound to give rise to a state of abuse of power and hence lead ultimately to the miscarriage of justice. Inefficiency and corruption will result as an outcome of failure to abide by the ‘principle of professional coordination’. Nepal’s criminal justice system is a unique example of such a situation. In such a situation, every agency is tantamount to endorsing the use of extra-legal methods in its performance. The need of kicking ass to keep people in order becomes a ‘general rule’ of belief. The brutal policing would then be a phenomenal feature. This situation will intensify the social disorder, injustice and ultimately appears with characters of ‘the criminalization of politics and politicization of crimes’. Disorder, fear, and crime undermine social and economic institutions to such an extent that families, schools, commerce and other institutions cannot function smoothly.22

Some scholars have rightly argued that the criminal justice system is not a system in its ‘structural framework’. For them, in a structural system in its true sense, the concerned actors are explicitly directed towards a particular objective by some coherent centralized authority.23 In the criminal justice system, however, none of the agencies or actors have authority to command others in their respective institutional administration and work. It can thus be argued that the criminal justice system is founded on a theoretical notion that rejects the existence of a vertical control mechanism. Every agency of the criminal justice system is associated with others horizontally, and, hence, functions with a scheme of a horizontal control mechanism. Every agency is independent in its assigned functions, but is guided by the indispensability of coordination between its respective functions, which provides for a system of mutual control by each other.

Different agencies are linked together through a process of actions in which one agency’s “output” becomes the next agency’s “input”.24 The weapons seized and the reports of fingerprints affixed on the weapon, for instance, are “outputs” of the investigator’s act, which becomes “input” to the prosecutor, as the charge sheet to be prepared by him/her should essentially be based on such evidence. The prosecutors cannot prosecute a person with evidence procured by themselves independently. The charge sheet, on the other hand, is the “output” of prosecutors, which constitutes an “input” for trial

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21 Ibid.
23 In countries that follow adversarial system, it is impossible to fashion the criminal justice system on vertical structure. In this system, each actor is accountable to its own central authority, and works independently. The police department in Nepal, for instance, is accountable to the Ministry of Home, and the prosecutors to the Attorney General. The system of courts is virtually independent of the executive control. Each of them is responsible to the other only because no action of one becomes meaningful without the other’s existence.
courts. This functional framework of the system presents a scheme of tightly knit ‘interdependence’ between agencies and requires an unavoidable interrelationship among different agencies involved. This scheme is an important benchmark of the successful criminal justice system. The interdependence constitutes a system in itself, and as such it is entirely guided by the need of objectively operationalizing the various aspects of work within the system; in any case it is not guided by motivation of control of one agency’s function by other.\textsuperscript{25}

Of course, the framework for coordination between these institutions is fashioned and functionalized by pre-determined laws and an overall system of governance adopted by the given society. In this context, various practical attributes such as the size and composition of the population, the historical contexts, the unique topography, the economic development pattern, the level of education, the functional capacity of agencies, etc. do play crucial roles in shaping the institutional framework and psychology of the interagency coordination.

\textit{Functional coordination of criminal justice agencies}

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p. 50.
These various factors shaping the structure and psychology of the system are defined as dynamics of the criminal justice system. The overriding and exaggerated institutional or organizational pride and prejudice generates serious obstacles in achieving the goals of the criminal justice system.

The adopted typology of the criminal justice model also is an important factor for shaping the required framework of the coordination. It is why the model or framework of the coordination adopted by countries with adversarial systems is different from that of countries adopting the inquisitorial one. When this framework is disregarded, the criminal justice system falls in a trap of chaos.

D. Coherent Function of the Criminal Justice System and the Professional Responsibilities of Investigators and Prosecutors

The fundamental objectives of the criminal justice system as discussed earlier make it clear that the ‘criminal justice system’ is not a coercive instrument of the State to inflict pains on people. It has specific goals to ‘protect and preserve’ human dignity and security. The criminal justice system in this sense is not a ‘law and order’ instrument of the police department; rather it is an ‘instrument of State to ensure’ safety of the society by criminalizing unacceptable behaviors, penalizing the wrongdoers and deterring the potential offender’. These objectives have been fulfilled by the State by ‘setting a fair and impartial system of trial’. The principle of ‘fair and impartial trial’ distributes powers to actors of criminal justice and rights to the accused in a wisely defined ‘scheme of operation’. The scheme can be outlined as follows:

a. Actors of criminal justice can curtail liberty of suspects as provided by the law. The suspect can be arrested and detained subject to law. A lawfully carried out arrest and detention cannot be challenged in court. However, the arrest and detention is to be based on objective evidence, but not on speculation or discretion of the arresting and detaining agencies. These values of the criminal justice system are found seriously lacking in developing countries mainly due to tendencies of violating or disregarding fundamental principles of criminal justice and laws established by the State. Arrest and detention without warrant, the manipulation of evidence by fabrication or failing to explore evidence, the excessive indulgence in interrogation to extract confessions, the practice of torture to press the suspect to confess, and the use of evidence without analysis are some examples of disregarding the value of fair and impartial justice.

b. Investigators can indulge in using any legally possible means of obtaining evidence. The State can use any amount of financial or human resources to procure evidence, and can use any type of expertise to sustain its findings. However, the State is expected to exercise this power by recognizing and protecting the due process or procedural rights of suspects. Unfortunately, the tendency of criminal justice actors in overlooking or violating the procedural rights of suspects or the accused is phenomenal. Torture is commonly used in developing countries as a legitimate tool for extracting confession.

c. Prosecutors can apply charges subject to laws that can be corroborated by evidence. They use resources as required by the need for sustaining the charge beyond reasonable doubt. However, the practice in developing countries is quite frustrating. The accused have been charged without adequate proof, and failure of such prosecution is bigger without any kind of accountability.

While using these authorities and powers, the investigators and prosecutors are supposed to pay respect to the following liberties or rights of accused:

a. Presumption of innocence. These agencies are obliged by laws to treat suspects with full dignity of their physical integrity and security of persons. The suspects ought not or cannot be treated like convicts. Therefore, no arrest, detention, interrogation or process of collating proof can deprive suspects of their rights to physical integrity and security of persons.26

26 See; Devlin Report to the Secretary of the State for Home Department (Departmental Committee on Evidence on Identification in Criminal Cases, 1996 II.C. 338, 1976.) UK.
b. **Right against self-incrimination is respected without exception.** The most significant rationale behind the right against self-incrimination is to prevent conviction of crime suspects based on confession as it is not only an unreliable piece of evidence but also tantamount to torturous or deceptive interrogation.\(^{27}\)

c. **Right to representation by lawyers.** No suspect or accused can be denied access to adequate legal defence.

The respect of suspects’ rights does automatically provide an opportunity for investigators and prosecutors to ‘best coordination’ between them. The respect of the right to silence does limit the scope of dependence on ‘confession’ as the basis of the charge. Prosecutors have to rely on investigators for more dependable proof of guilt, and thus it ensures their watchful attitude over the investigators. Balancing the ‘power of criminal justice actors and rights of suspect’ theory is thus crucial for successful operation of the criminal justice system in any society. This theory is important to generating the belief among prosecutors that:

a. **Adequate and scientific investigation is a tool of effective prosecution:** Hence, the prosecutor has to legally guard the proceedings of collating evidence and assist investigators legally in matters of search and seizure and ensuring legal technicalities of the documents. Investigators are thus part of the prosecution work. The investigator’s opinion about, and interpretation and construction of evidence, is a boon for prosecutors. The mutual collaboration between investigators and prosecutors is thus a ‘keystone’ of a successful prosecution.

b. **The objective of investigation is to supply data for prosecutors on the given criminal act to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt:** The prosecutor has to have the qualities of a ‘research analyst’. The evidence does not speak, but it should be made to speak by the prosecutor. Prosecutors are not ‘fax machines’ to receive documents from the police and submit them to the court. They are professional actors with capacity to ‘conduct methodological enquiry’ of all evidence supplied by the investigators.

c. **Investigators and prosecutors are individually accountable for the ‘success and failure’ of their work. It is not their institution that is accountable for success of investigation and prosecution:** Both these actors are responsible to ‘collectively work for burden of proof against [the] suspect on behalf of the state’. The punishment and reward is thus individual not institutional.

d. **The prosecution is a key agency in an adversarial system:** Hence, he/she should acquire ability to represent the State. The investigator has to coordinate himself/herself with prosecutors for acquiring reliable evidence with legal sustainability.

Most of all, the lack of appropriate forensic technology is an equally important challenge in developing countries. This technology is expensive and unaffordable generally. The rapid changes of the societal structure, the system of governance and political instability, and lack of adequate research facilities are also serious challenges. However, such challenges can be easily handled provided that the ‘investigators and prosecutors’ bring about changes in their stereotyped institutional pride and prejudice and begin working as a team.

**III. INITIATIVES FOR ENHANCEMENT OF PRESERVATION, ANALYSIS AND USE OF EVIDENCE FOR WORTHY PROSECUTION AND FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL**

The foregoing discussion argues that ‘the major problem of the criminal justice system in developing countries is associated with the ‘evidence collection and analysis method’. The method is generally archaic, confession oriented, and stricken by abuse of power and torture. Most charge sheets brought

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by the prosecutors are based on ‘confessions’ extracted by use of deceptive interrogation or physical force. The use of mental torture is also a common tool of extracting confessions. The interest and inspiration of the investigator in exploring scientific evidence is not profoundly noticeable, hence the emphasis lies on ‘extraction’ of confessions. The tendency that the confession is the conclusive evidence is random among the investigators and prosecutors of the developing countries. The overriding emphasis and reliance on confession deactivates the investigators and prosecutors of the developing countries from exploring scientific evidence. Equally true is the fact the ‘the availability’ of forensic facilities is scarcely limited. The evidence produced by forensic and other scientific means are also found tainted by several reasons. The protection of the scene of crime and preservation of evidence is a serious problem as well as a challenge in the developing countries. Some studies show that the following problems are commonly encountered in this regard:

a. **Protection of the scene of crime and preservation of the evidence**: It is said that evidence that is lying on the ground loosely can be collected and catalogued by using proper methods of collection and preservation. Both the collection and preservation call for seriousness on the part of the investigators and the use of proper technology for collecting so that the properties of the evidence are not destroyed or tainted. The serious challenge in this regard in developing countries is associated with the level of awareness of the public as well as the police personnel. The invasion of the scene of crime by flocks of members of the public and security personnel is a serious problem, which not only contaminates the scene of the crime but also destroys the traces of evidence left by the offender; evidence such as fingerprints, the footprints, the bodily fluids, traces of threads and hair and other useful evidentiary marks to be found at the scene of the crime are either contaminated, tainted or destroyed. In such a situation, the scope of using forensic technology and DNA analysis of the evidence to be found at the scene of the crime is markedly low in developing countries. Collection and preservation of evidence from the scene of the crime is a serious challenge in developing countries. In Nepal, for instance, numbers of samples collected are un-examinable for contamination during collection or delay in sending them to the forensic laboratory. Considering the types of problems, the following remedies are to be adopted in order to allow forensic science to enhance the quality of criminal justice:

- Awareness training for grassroots police personnel on the importance of protecting the scene of the crime and preservation of evidence and other traces found there. It is found that the grassroots police personnel need to be educated about the authenticity and reliability of the evidence to be produced by the use of forensic science. This initiative will prevent unwanted entry of the police personnel as well as the common people within the scene of crime. The equipment and materials can be used for making the scene of the crime preserved.

- Making provision of adequate numbers of scene-of-crime officers is essential, followed by intensive training on skills of collecting samples from the crime scene. Greater numbers of scene-of-crime officers make it possible to reach the crime scene in time, so that many important traces can be collected before they are destroyed by natural phenomena such as rain, hot sun, or storms, fog, dust and so on.


31 In a forensic training for the crime investigators in Nepal, from November 2013 to March 2014, it was learned that the preservation of the crime scene would be problematic due to lack of essential materials such as ribbons, pillars and so on. The senior police officer engaged in the training as a resource person, however, suggested that the ‘plastic role or locally made organic ropes’ could be used for this purpose considering their lasting nature. He thus suggested to make a long plastic rope as part of the ‘forensic kit-box’ provided to the scene of crime officer’.

Training is also necessary on enhancing the sensitivity of the scene-of-crime officer to deliver
the collected samples in time. In Nepal, a large number of such samples are destroyed by delay
in delivery of the samples to the laboratory.33

It is also necessary to clearly mark the ‘types or categories’ of samples collected from the scene
of the crime. It is also necessary to mark the samples by indicating who they actually belong
to—the accused or the victim. It was learned that it was another important area of mistake
to be made by the scene-of-crime officer.34

Each piece of evidence is to be given an individual identification mark or number so that it can
be cross-matched against the corresponding investigative report. It was reportedly another
area of mistake to be committed by the scene-of-crime officer. Many samples were found
collected in different bags or tubes and put into a bigger bag with one identification number.35

Investigators in the developing countries also need an elaborative training for maintaining
‘chain of custody’ of the forensic evidence. The chain of custody is a document to be filled out
by the concerned officer who wishes to use or view the evidence. This is necessary to prevent
loss of evidence and/or cross contamination by individuals who should not have contact with
it.36

The area of the scene of the crime is to be photographed as rule. The detail signs of injury
such blood stains are marked properly. These photographs are crucial evidence in the piecing
together of an event so that investigators who are not able to visit the scene of crime can get
detailed information of the situation.

b. Information of the scene of crime to the prosecutor: As it has fairly been described, the impor-
tance of ‘evidence’ as a source of ‘reasoning’ already before, the concentration of the investigating
officer should be laid on procuring such proof from the scene of the crime that it will provide a strong
reasoning to the prosecutor for making him/her able to determine the nature of corpus delicti and its
meaningful relation with the alleged offender. The prosecutor may be able to suggest the nature of
proof required in that given crime. The communication between the investigating officer and the
prosecutor is not only desirable but inevitable. From this point of view, the prosecutor must take the
lead in coordinating with the investigating officer in the following matters as a necessary modus
operandi for properly collecting and preserving evidence from the scene of the crime:

• Autopsy: The prosecutor must be able to say what exactly he/she wants the performing
doctor to mention in the autopsy report. The prosecutor therefore must clearly instruct the
investigating officer, who, in turn, must visit the performing doctor to advise on their require-
ment. It is advisable for the investigating officer to give a detailed perspective of the scene of
the crime to the doctor, and if possible, invite the doctor to visit the scene of the crime. In
Nepal, for instance, the autopsy is found largely undependable as evidence because it fails to
mention the details which are necessary for generating reasoning for the prosecutor. The main
reason is that ‘the dead body is dumped’ in the hospital by the junior personnel who has no
knowledge of investigation.37

• DNA analysis: The prosecutor must be able to suggest to the scientists carrying out the
analysis on his/her requirement. Scientific language is not common or comprehensible for all.
As a matter of fact, the prosecutor must require the scientists to make detailed elaboration of

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
37 For detail See; Yubaraj Sangroula, “Jurisprudential and Jurimetrics Analysis of Florence Evidence” in Yubaraj
Sangroula, et al. (eds) Jurisprudence About DNA Analysis and Scientific Evidences, CeLRRd, 2010 B.S. (2013), Kathmandu,
pp.1-22.
their opinions by graphs, notation, narration, or elucidation. Only such reports can be sustainably used for generating the scientific reasoning. The importance of such elaboration is particularly important considering the absence of specialist expert prosecutors, judges and defence attorneys.

- **Custody Chain:** The legality or legitimacy of the ‘chain of custody’—the document prepared by the scientist—must be obtained by the prosecutor for two main reasons: one, to prevent any manipulation of the evidence; another, to prepare for examination of the expert witness in court. The custody chain will thus be an important source of legality of the evidence.

This *modus operandi* of collection, preservation and examination of forensic evidence will ensure the following:

a. Circumvention of the possibility of contamination or destruction of evidence.

b. Prevention of the possibility of manipulation of evidence for an ulterior motive by any person including the offender.

c. Establishment of the unchallengeable legitimacy of the evidence.

d. Establishing the accuracy and tangibility of the evidence.

Collectively, these elements will guarantee the success of prosecution, and thus avoid the miscarriage of justice.

**IV. CONCLUSIONS**

Considering from the wider perspective of the criminal justice systems in the developing countries, the scenario seems not very encouraging. One of the major problems is generated, in most countries in Asia, by the ‘unplanned transplantation’ of the system of past colonial masters. India has been a glaring example. The stereotyped attitude of the State and its criminal justice agencies that the criminal justice system is a coercive apparatus of the State for peace and order in the society is viciously responsible for blocking the desired change in the system. The tendency of sticking to a conventional approach of investigation, which does not emphasize the cooperation and collaboration between the investigating officer and the prosecutor that overwhelmingly focuses on a confession-oriented investigation system, is another obstacle to reforms of the criminal justice systems in developing countries. These problems and challenges can largely be addressed by popularizing the use of forensic science in investigation. Hence, the developing countries must emphasize use of science and forensic technology in dispensation of criminal justice.

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38 For detailed information in this regard, see the Malimath Committee Report.