CORRECTIONAL SERVICE CANADA

CHANGING LIVES. PROTECTING CANADIANS.

Management of Radicalized Offenders and Security Threat Groups in a Correctional Context

Presentation to the 167th Training Course – UNAFEI
Tokyo, Japan

Correctional Service Canada | Service correctionnel Canada

Dr. Andrea Moser, C.Psych.

Canada

Overview of Presentation

- Recap of what we know about STGs and Radicalized Offenders
- Population Management Strategies for STGs and Radicalized Offenders
- Assessment of STGs and Radicalized Offenders
- Intervention with STGs and Radicalized Offenders
- The importance of collaboration with external partners

Recap

- Definitions
- Identification
- Research

Acknowledgement – Information Sources

- It should be noted that much of the material presented in this deck is derived from the Correctional Service of Canada's Parole Officer Continuous Development Training Modules on Security Threat Groups and Radicalized Offenders as well as studies completed by CSC's Research Branch.

Issues in the Correctional Management of STGs and Radicalized Offenders

- Accommodation and Population Management
- Information Sharing – Internal and External
- Staff Training

Security Threat Groups

- In CSC, Security Threat Group membership continues to be an ongoing concern for the safety and security of staff, the public and offenders. Their activities are disruptive and can affect the smooth running of most medium and maximum security institutions. This includes the drug trade inside most institutions, which may lead to violent confrontation between different Security Threat Groups trying to enlarge or maintain their customer base.

- CSC continues to work to develop effective strategies for this subgroup as part of its National Population Management Strategy.

- Staff training on STGs and information sharing is a key element, as is the role of Security Intelligence Officers (SIOs) inside institutions.

CSC - Legislation/Policy involving Security Threat Groups

Commissioner's Directive 568-3
Identification and Management of Security Threat Groups

Purpose
- To establish a framework for the identification and management of security threat groups and offenders affiliated with same
- To recognize that affiliation to security threat groups is considered a significant risk, poses a serious threat to the safety and security of the Correctional Service of Canada's operations and compromises the protection of society
- To prevent offenders affiliated with security threat groups from exercising influence and power and to prevent actions and circumstances that enhance their image and prestige
- To support and assist offenders' termination of affiliation with security threat groups

CSC - Legislation/Policy involving Security Threat Groups

Commissioner's Directive 568-7

Management of Incompatible Offenders

Purpose
- To provide direction for the identification and management of incompatible offenders

Application
- Applies to staff responsible for identifying and managing incompatible offenders

Management of Incompatible Offenders

- Incompatible offenders: offenders who pose a threat to the safety and well-being of each other and may present a risk to staff, the public or other offenders.

- Incompatibilities can occur between any offenders for a variety of reasons. With STGs, these can arise related to issues of gang affiliations and rivalries.

- In CSC, Security Intelligence Officers (SIOs) are responsible for coordinating and implementing procedures for the identification and management of incompatible offenders. Therefore, when any staff member becomes aware of information that may identify offenders as being incompatible, this information must be reported in writing to the SIO who will take the appropriate action.

Management of Incompatible Offenders

Upon the identification of incompatible offenders, conflict resolution is typically the first action that will be taken by the SIO where it is deemed appropriate, with the aim of allowing the incompatible offenders to resolve the reasons for their incompatibilities. In the event that conflict resolution was unsuccessful or not warranted, various risk management options will be considered including, but not limited to:

1. Not transferring the incompatible offenders to the same institution unless the risk can be managed within the same institution (i.e. in a different unit or range);
2. Not housing the offenders in the same unit, range or cell;
3. Not housing them in the same community-based residential facility; and
4. Implementing additional precautions when incompatible offenders report to the same parole office.

Accommodation Issues – Radicalized Offenders

"To a great extent, managing institutions holding violent extremist prisoners requires the same "core" prison management approach as managing prisons detaining any other group of prisoners. Violent extremist prisoners, like other prisoners, need to be kept securely, provided with basic necessities such as food and clothing, looked after with humanity and given opportunities to reform and rehabilitate themselves."

UNODC Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons, p.9

Models of Accommodation

- UNODC Handbook on the Management of VEPs note that each prison administration needs to determine the best approach to accommodation, based on specific factors within the country (p. 47)

Models of Accommodation

Factors to be considered include*:

• The size of the violent extremist prison population being managed

• The state of the prison infrastructure and the administration's ability to ensure secure custody if violent extremists were dispersed to a number of prisons

• The capacity, size and skills level of staff

• The financial resources available to manage the violent extremist prisoner population

• The legislative framework and responsible authorities

• The cultural, political and social context

• The risk that an individual presents for being further radicalized, or for radicalizing others to violence

• The modus operandi and organizational structure of the violent extremist group

*UNODC Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization in Prisons

---

CSC Management Strategy – Radicalized Offenders
Overarching Pillars

CSC

Correctional Operations & Programs Sector

| Prevention | Detection | Intervention | Reintegration |

Integration-Separation Accommodation Strategy

Behavioural Change Resource, Information Sharing & Staff Terrorism Prevention Training

CSC Intersect Model , Security TRA National Policy & Guidelines, Site Level Procedures

Specialized Risk Assessment

Disengagement Initiatives, Psychology, Chaplaincy, Community Resource Collaboration

External Partner Info Sharing, Intelligence Analysis & Operational Investigation Collaboration

Canada's CT Strategy:

| Prevent | - | Detect | - | Deny | - | Respond |

Criminal Spectrum:

| Investigations | Incarceration | Release |

Management Strategy - Purpose

- Research indicates the importance of policies and **evidence-based population management practices** designed to address and counter radicalization and ideologically motivated violent extremism.

- To ensure that the CVE programs of our Canadian and international law enforcement and criminal justice partners are founded on the principles established in **'Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy'** and active CACP and Public Safety-led initiatives.

- To facilitate a **Service-wide approach**, in that the effective management of the radicalized offender population depends on the coordination and cooperation of numerous Sectors/Branches/Divisions in the organization, as well as correctional staff in our institutions and parole districts.

- To delineate the overarching pillars of activity: **prevention, detection, intervention, and reintegration.** Within these pillars exist sub-strategies for effective accommodation, identification, communication, assessment, disengagement, and community collaboration.

Correctional Service of Canada (CSC)

Accommodation Model –Radicalized Offenders

- CSC does not accommodate its terrorist-convicted offenders in dedicated prisons, instead utilizing an *Integration-Separation* accommodation model to manage radicalized and terrorism-convicted offenders.

- This approach predominantly focuses on the integration of radicalized offenders in an open general population environment; however, it permits for the physical/geographical separation of these offenders where security information suggest that the direct association of two or more radicalized offenders poses a threat to the offender, institution, or staff.

- Offender's behaviour and needs remain the focus of CSC's current radicalized offender accommodation strategy.

- This strategy avoids granting of unwarranted status onto the radicalized offender by minimizing 'profiling' and/or 'targeting' and defuses potential radicalization or recruitment power base.

Other Operational Considerations

- Primary security focus is on disengagement of offender's violent extremist behaviours and activities, secondary to which is efforts towards de-radicalization

- Ensure CSC policies and procedures governing the management of radicalized and terrorist convicted offenders are in accordance with the Service's core values and the law

- Ensure our decisions and direction are well reasoned, based on comprehensive consultation and empirical evidence, and respect human rights

- Maintain our existing relationships, and develop new domestic and international partnerships to enrich our working knowledge and share best practices

Information Sharing

Information Sharing & Partner Relations:

- CSC possesses MOU's with criminal justice and law enforcement partners which allow for sharing of information on national security cases (e.g., RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, OPP, etc.)

- This includes support of active operational/criminal investigations

- Sharing of intelligence (e.g. analysis) between respective agencies on a '*need to know*' basis is an integral component in the process of identification, prevention, and intervention

- CSC has standing membership on International and Federal, Provincial and Municipal National Security – Countering Violent Extremism Work Groups (e.g. PSC, CACP, UN GCTF)

Staff Training

- Important that staff receive training on topics such as STGs and Radicalized Offenders.

- UNODC Handbook (2016) notes: *" Training, which is crucial to any environment, is especially important for people working with violent extremist prisoners".*

- In CSC, frontline correctional, security and parole staff are provided training on STG identification and management, which includes training on the identifiers and behaviours of individuals and groups who pose a security risk to CSC operations.

ASSESSMENT

ASSESSMENT	→	MEMBERS OF A SECURITY THREAT GROUP
	→	RADICALIZED OFFENDERS

Risk Assessment Principles

- Risk assessment of STG members and radicalized offenders must be grounded in an overall evidence-based approach

- Specifically, while specialized tools can be considered, this should be as an adjunct to research-based, validated tools for criminal risk and need.

Intake Assessment

- A systematic and comprehensive process to determine security risk and needs, as well as the appropriate security level for initial placement to an institution (maximum, medium, minimum)

- Immediately after the court sentences an offender, information about the offender and the offence(s) is collected from many sources such as police, crown attorneys, judges, courts, victims and family members.

- When an offender reaches the institution, he/she undergoes an evaluation to determine the factors that may have led to the criminal behaviour for which he/she has been sentenced.

- The offender intake assessment process results in a multi-disciplinary correctional plan for treatment and intervention throughout the sentence.

Risk Assessment – Correctional Service Canada

### The Offender Intake Assessment (OIA)

The Offender Intake Assessment is a comprehensive evaluation of an offender conducted at the time of admission to the Correctional Service Canada by institutional parole officers. All offenders complete the OIA (full or compressed version)

The assessment consists of two core components:
- Static Risk Assessment
- Dynamic Factors Identification and Analysis (DFIA-R)

The assessment involves collection and analysis of information on the following:
- Offender's criminal and mental health history
- Social situation
- Education
- Other factors relevant to determining criminal risk and needs

---

ASSESSMENT	→	MEMBERS OF A SECURITY THREAT GROUP
	→	RADICALIZED OFFENDERS

Risk Assessment: Members of a Security Threat Group

Security Threat Group Designation:

- The OIA can distinguish whether or not participants are considered members of a Security Threat Groups.

According to CSC members of a criminal organization include:
- Key Player
- Member
- Associate

- The affiliation level of an offender with a security threat group (member/associate/key player) will be considered a significant risk factor when making any decision related to the offender. The Case Management Team will consider the current activity level of the offender (active or inactive) when assessing risk and when making recommendations related to the offender.

Risk Assessment: Members of a Security Threat Group

### Dynamic Factors Identification and Analysis (DFIA)

- As mentioned, assesses a variety of evidence-based criminogenic factors groups into seven domains, which are measured by several indicators. Scores on the indicators place the offenders on a four-point scale of need.

The seven domains include:

- **Associates/social interaction**
- **Attitudes**
- **Community functioning**
- **Employment/education**
- **Marital/family**
- **Personal/emotional**
- **Substance abuse**

Risk Assessment: Members of a Security Threat Group

- Examination of criminogenic risk, need and reintegration potential found that the typical criminal organization offender was assessed as being "medium" risk (58.1%) and "high" need (45.9%), with "high" reintegration potential (68.8%). Domain-level analyses of need illustrated that criminal organization offenders were significantly more likely to have some or considerable need in the areas of criminal attitudes and criminal associates than a matched sample of CSC offenders.

ASSESSMENT

MEMBERS OF A SECURITY THREAT GROUP

RADICALIZED OFFENDERS

How to assess risk/needs for radicalized offenders

- As described, offender risk level, needs and reintegration potential are assessed initially as part of the Offender Intake Assessment (OIA) process.

- Offenders are rated as high, medium or low risk, and are rated on the extent of their need based upon the seven overarching criminogenic domain areas.

- CSC then aims to tailor its Correctional Plans according to the risk principle, that is, to match the required degree of correctional treatment to the identified needs of the offender.

How to assess risk/needs for radicalized offenders

- While these need domains are evidence-based risk factors related to criminal behaviour, research has demonstrated that the individuals who have been deemed radicalized may have unique needs and motivations that may not be systematically and empirically measured through the OIA, but which may nevertheless benefit from targeted programming.

- At present however, CSC does not use an assessment instrument tailored specifically to radical offenders. The applicability of specialized risk assessments for radical or violent extremist offenders is presently under careful consideration in CSC's ongoing research and international consultation on this specific population of offenders.

Comparisons of Radicalized and Non-Radicalized Federal Offenders

- CSC research indentified and compared the differences between radicalized offenders and the mainstream offender population.

- As a group, radicalized offenders frequently differed from their non–radicalized counterparts.

Results/findings

- Younger
- No criminal history
- Educated
- Better employment histories
- Better adjustment in terms of mental health and institutional behaviour
- Less likely to be Canadian citizens, more likely to be of a visible minority group
- Fewer problems with the abuse of alcohol and other drugs
- Less frequently assessed as presenting high levels of criminogenic need or low levels of community reintegration potential

Stys, Y., Gobeil, R., Harris, A. J. R., & Michel, S. (2014). *Violent extremists in federal institutions: Estimating radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization in the federal offender population* (Research Report R-313).Ottawa, ON: Correctional Service of Canada.

Specialized Risk Assessment Tools

- UNODC Handbook notes that a limited number of tools have been developed to specifically assess VEPs.

- These tools have only been used with a limited number of offenders and in specific jurisdictions and contexts, so their validity may be limited.

- It may not be realistic to deploy these tools in jurisdictions with limited resources, given they are often very comprehensive and resource intensive.

Example – Specialized Assessments Radicalized Offenders

- Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA-2R)

    (Pressman E., Duits, N., Rinne, T. And Flockton, J. (2016) VERA-2R Violence Risk Assessment – Version 2 Revised: A structured professional judgement approach, Nederlands Institut voor Forensische Psychiatrie en Psychologie.

- Extremist Risk Guidelines (ERG22+)

    Lloyd, M. And Dean, C. (2015) "The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders", *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2015, Vol. 2, No. 1, 40-52.*

VERA-2R

- Designed to be used with the following groups:
    - People who are suspected of being radicalized to violence
    - Who are in the process of being radicalized to violence
    - Who have a history of extremist violence
    - Who have been convicted of terrorist-related offences

    From UNODC Handbook on the Management of VEPs (2016), p. 56

VERA-2R

- Can contribute to a multi-modal risk assessment process
- Reliant on information initially obtained and validated by intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies
- The VERA-2 focused on a number of factors such as attitudes-beliefs-ideology, social context and intention, history and capability, motivational and commitment factors. It also includes protective factors
- The VERA-2R is an augmented version that includes additional indicators such as mental health background.

From UNODC Handbook on the Management of VEPs (2016), p. 56

ERG22+

- Developed to assess individuals and the personal and contextual circumstances contributing to their extremist offending or the offending in the future
- Case formulation approach is used
- Particularly appropriate for idiosyncratic offending
- Employs Structured Professional Judgement
- Assessors consider 3 dimensions: 1) Engagement, 2) Intent & 3) Capability
- 22 factors identified that seem to contribute to extremist offending that map onto the 3 dimensions

From UNODC Handbook on the Management of VEPs (2016), p. 56

INTERVENTIONS

Security Threat Groups

INTERVENTIONS

→ HOW CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMS TARGET SECURITY THREAT GROUP ASSOCIATIONS

→ HOW PAROLE OFFICERS CAN INTERVENE WITH SECURITY THREAT GROUP ASSOCIATIONS

→ HOW PAROLE OFFICERS CAN SUPERVISE CONDITIONS FOR OFFENDERS AFFILIATED TO SECURITY THREAT GROUPS IN THE COMMUNITY

Principles of Effective Correctional Programming

- Grounded in Risk-Needs-Responsivity Model (Andrews, Bonta & Hoge, 1990):

1. **Risk principle** (match level of program intensity to offender risk level; intensive levels of treatment for higher risk offenders and minimal intervention for low-risk offenders)
2. **Need principle** (target criminogenic needs or those offender needs that are functionally related to criminal behavior)
3. **Responsivity** principle (match the style and mode of intervention to the offender's learning style and abilities)

Principles of Effective Correctional Programming

- Program models and content based on "What Works" evidence from the research literature

- "Fidelity" of programs is key – manualized approach, staff training and certification, ongoing research and evaluation

Correctional Programs & Intervention Approaches
Correctional Service Canada

- The Integrated Correctional Program Model (ICPM) is a comprehensive correctional program strategy that extends from the intake stage of the correctional process to the community. It provides consistent and systematic intervention from start to finish of an offender's sentence. Individual needs are identified up front and then those needs are targeted and addressed as the offender proceeds through his sentence, from reception, to institution, to community.

- The integrated program has three streams:
  - ➢ Multi-Target
  - ➢ Aboriginal ⎯ moderate or high intensity
  - ➢ Sex Offender

- Each stream has its own version of the Primer, the main program and maintenance.

- The multi-target nature of ICPM allows CSC to more holistically address the individual needs and risks of offenders.

How Correctional Programs can target STG associations

- As the ICPM was designed for moderate to high risk offenders the programs is appropriate for members of STG groups who are mainly criminally motivated.

- There are 4 modules of the ICPM multi-target moderate and high intensity program – next slides will examine how each module applies to members of Security Threat Groups.

How Correctional Programs target STG associations

ICPM multi-target moderate and high intensity

Module 1 of the ICPM multi-target moderate and high intensity programs focuses on good relationships and support. Within this module, participants establish goals for their 'Good Life', and explore barriers to change. Participants also identify the various people in their lives and assess whether or not those individuals have a positive or negative impact on their lives. Social skills, establishing boundaries and assertiveness are explored, and participants are given opportunities to practice the application of these skills through various role-play scenarios. This module assists participants, including STG members with criminal associates, to identify individuals in their lives who may lead them away from their goals and/or put them in high risk situations and develop skills to break ties with negative associates, while building and strengthening relationships with more positive influences.

STG Targets: Associates, Goals

How Correctional Programs target STG associations

ICPM multi-target moderate and high intensity

In **Module 2** of the program, participants explore personal beliefs and expectations that they hold, and how these beliefs can play a role in their interpretation of events and how they in turn react. By identifying their core beliefs, participants can begin to examine how 'violations' of their personal expectations (e.g. need for approval or control) can lead to risky emotions and behaviors. Participants then review strategies to challenge risky thoughts and expectations effectively.

STG Targets: Beliefs, Emotions Management

How Correctional Programs target STG associations

ICPM multi-target moderate and high intensity

Module 3 of the programs focuses on clear thinking and healthy decisions. Participants examine types of thinking that support risky behavior (e.g. substance abuse, general violence, partner violence and crime for gain), identify self-talk that justifies harmful behaviors and explore the motives behind harmful behaviors. Within this module, STG members can apply program content in order to identify how their thinking justified the use of harmful behavior, including violence, and the positives and negatives that resulted from those behaviors.

STG Targets: Risky Thinking

How Correctional Programs target STG associations

ICPM multi-target moderate and high intensity

In **Module 4** of the program, participants explore the role of their lifestyle in their crime process including risks and protective factors. This module assists participants in examining how to apply program skills to effectively deal with conflict and pressure to engage in harmful activities. The program content in this module pertains to interactions with risky associates and how to establish boundaries and resist peer pressure will be particularly salient for STG members with harmful associates.

STG Targets: Associates

How Parole Officers can intervene with STG associations (based on ICPM)

- Despite their distinct features, STG offenders who meet the referral criteria for ICPM (i.e., low-moderate to high risk offenders) should be referred to the appropriate ICPM program.

- Criminalised low risk STG offenders who meet the override criteria for ICPM should be considered for referral to the ICPM program by way of an override

- With any offender who has completed an ICPM program, Parole Officers can maintain program skills by referring to a "Self-Management Pocket Plan" which provides a summary of the skills taught in the ICPM programs.

How Parole Officers can intervene with STG group associations (based on ICPM)

Low risk STG affiliated offenders who do not meet the referral criteria for correctional programs can be managed by a combination of the following strategies many of which are similar to the ones used in the ICPM:

- Helping to identify which goals offenders were trying to attain by their criminal behaviours and normalizing the goal (e.g. sense of justice, belonging, meaning) without legitimizing the violent or criminal means.

- Non confrontational approach exploring the pros and cons of the old way.

- Identifying reasons for change, including loyalty to family, spouses and children.

How Parole Officers can intervene with STG group associations (based on ICPM)

- Supporting any expressed attitudes suggesting the desire to get on with one's life, leave the old way behind

- Exploring life choices which move the offender away from engagement with the violent ideology

- Promoting meaningful goals which are incompatible with radical violence (education, job skills, employment, family, social integration)

- Supporting educational and employment activities and plans

How parole officers can intervene with Security Threat Group associations

The following ten best practices were submitted by correctional staff as being particularly effective in assisting them in managing their site level STG populations:

(1) Collecting information on STG affiliations;
(2) Ensuring high quality security information;
(3) Sharing information with institutional staff;
(4) Sharing information with external partners;
(5) STG separation from general population;
(6) Specialized transition unit for offenders who terminated their affiliation to a STG;
(7) Transfers to disrupt STG activity;
(8) Integration;
(9) Building credibility and rapport with offenders; and
(10) Providing choices for respect.

Community Reintegration of STGs

Issues to consider:

- Safe release
- Special Conditions
- Supervision

Radicalized Offenders

Interventions with Radicalized Offenders

- As with STGs in general, CSC utilizes evidence based correctional programs such as ICPM that are proven to significantly reduce rates of recidivism. As noted, these cognitive-behavioral programs target violence and the influence of antisocial associates

- The CSC also uses inter-faith counselling within the spiritual service delivery model and access to ethno-cultural services to counter extremist ideology, present pro-social modelling, and help identify potential risk

The Role of Chaplaincy

- As previously identified, religious extremism is only one of the many types of ideologically motivated violence that pose a security threat.

- While Islamist inspired (i.e. AQ & ISIS) extremism is known to pose a national security threat, it is important to separate faith and religion as the underlying cause for these actions/activities. Religion serves only to justify ones actions, when the real reasons are more often inspired by politics, personal grievance, or cultural dissonance, etc.

- Faith worship and religious change are a Canadian Human right and freedom. Exploring the spiritual dimension of life and the role of spirituality in addressing the challenges of incarceration are beneficial and can play an important part in an offender's rehabilitation.

Chaplaincy

- Through the provision of spiritual services and support, CSC promotes offender accountability and positive relationships among offenders, their families, and faith communities in order to assist with offenders' successful reintegration.

- CSC respects the religious freedom and right of expression of federal offenders of all faiths, and provides support and services to offenders of all religious backgrounds, as per the *Corrections and Conditional Release Act* and the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

Chaplaincy

- While chaplains are not required to engage in counter-radicalization strategies among any particular group, they are an integral part of CSC's effort to actively encourage and assist offenders to become law-abiding citizens.

- Chaplains facilitate the connection of offenders with members of their own faith communities. These activities help offenders examine their behaviours and decisions and discover new ways of living. This can help offenders accept responsibility for their actions, which in turn contributes to their safe reintegration into our communities. In addition, chaplains consult and work with case management teams as part of their work with offenders.

The Role of Mental Health professionals in Assessment and Intervention with Radicalized Offenders

- There are several important roles for mental health colleagues (examples include Psychologists, Psychiatrists, Physicians, Nurses, and Clinical Social Workers) in the management of radicalized offenders:

1. Providing subject matter expertise in the gathering and interpretation of research.

➢ The identification of pertinent and informative research is paramount in building a team's knowledge and skill, to enhance their ability to recognize offenders who may be at risk of radicalization. The mental health professional can utilize research results to educate the team on evolving trends, innovative and best practice methods to assist offenders at risk.

The Role of Mental Health Professionals (continued)

2. Informing on effective prevention activities that will engage and support vulnerable offenders, subsequently reducing the risk of radicalization.

➢ Prevention activities are programs, policies and interventions that promote inclusion and well being and will strengthen individuals in ways that reduce vulnerability to engaging in violent extremism.

The Role of Mental Health Professionals (continued)

3. Informing on effective prevention activities that will engage and support vulnerable offenders, subsequently reducing the risk of radicalization.

➢ Identify potential risk factors (e.g. Ideologist, grievances, moral emotions and link risk factors to assist with identification of supports).

➢ Explore experiences of discrimination or stereotyping.

➢ Consider violent extremism action when assessing for violence.

➢ Identification of inmates who may be susceptible to violent extremist ideology.

➢ Assessment based on facts and evidence rather than believed characteristic or "traits" or terrorists.

➢ Prevention and intervention efforts should continuously monitor at-risk offenders to determine if the structured activities are effective and progress has been made in key indicators.

➢ Feedback from staff implementing the intervention and other disciplines is needed to determine if the intervention plan needs to be modified.

➢ Ongoing screening for increased risk of suicide of high risk offenders to consider risk factors such as, previous attempts, history of self-injury, family history, etc.

Disengagement from Radicalization

• Disengagement: "the process of ceasing terrorist activity. It does not always involve a change in ideology or beliefs, but does require an end to terrorist behavior" (Horgan, 2008)

• Disengagement is distinct from deradicalization

• As noted in the UNODC Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremists (2016) – interventions that aim for disengagement are likely to be more successful in reaching their goals (p. 71)

Disengagement from Radicalization

- Research has found that former violent extremists who have reintegrated most successfully are those who have made significant changes in 6 domains*:
  - Social relations
  - Coping
  - Identity
  - Ideology
  - Action Orientation
  - Disillusionment

* See UNODC Handbook, p. 71-72 and Barellea, K. (2015), Noricks, D. (2009), Horgan, J. (2009), Bjorgo & Horgan, (2008)

Research on Disengagement

Work by John Horgan notes the following:

- There is no single reason why individuals walk away from terrorism
- A review of the literature indicates that certain factors may make individuals more likely to disengage.
- These hypothesized factors can be grouped into **push** and **pull** factors. **Push factors** are associated with the challenges of engagement and commitment to a terrorist group. **Pull factors** are the lures that draw people towards a different life."

Horgan, J. (2014). *Psychology of terrorism* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.

Push and Pull Factors

Push Factors:

- Disillusionment with key personnel of a terrorist group
- Disillusionment with the strategy or actions of the terrorist group
- Unmet expectations
- Loss of faith in the ideology
- Difficulty adapting to the clandestine lifestyle
- Inability to cope with physiological and psychological effects of carrying out attacks
- Burnout

Horgan, J. (2014). *Psychology of terrorism* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.

Push and Pull Factors

Pull Factors:

- Competing loyalties
- Positive interactions with those who hold moderate views
- Longing for the freedoms of a conventional life
- Employment/educational demands or opportunities
- Desire to marry and establish a family or the demands of having a family
- Promise of amnesty
- Financial incentives

Horgan, J. (2014). *Psychology of terrorism* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.

Stages of the Disengagement Process

From: Horgan, 2008 - Horgan notes that the stages of the disengagement process are adapted from Ebaugh's (1988) model of voluntary role exit.

External partner collaboration

- As noted in the UNODC Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners (2016), prison administrations should cooperate with other law enforcement and criminal justice agencies with respect to the VE prisoners in their custody. Intelligence and other relevant information should be shared across agencies. (p. 135)

- International cooperation and information sharing is also critical

CSC's Domestic and International Collaboration

- CSC is continually developing and maintaining domestic and international capacity-building partnerships to enrich our working knowledge in this area and share our experienced 'best practices' with others.

CSC's Domestic and International Collaboration

•**Domestically** CSC maintains active membership on Public Safety Canada's Countering Radicalization to Violence– Interdepartmental Working Group (CRV-WG), the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security (CCRS) the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) Counter-Terrorism & National Security Committee (CTNS) Working Group, the Heads of Corrections (HOC) Meetings between Federal-Provincial Security Intelligence counterparts.

CSC's Domestic and International Collaboration

- **Internationally** CSC is represented at the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) – Detention & Reintegration Working Group, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) - Radicalized Offender Expert Working Group, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI).

- CSC also has Memoranda of Understanding in relation to collaborative efforts in the Management of Radicalized Offenders with Correctional Service Departments from Sweden, France, United Kingdom, United States and Australia.

Questions and Discussion

For more information:

Andrea Moser, Ph.D., C.Psych.

Director General, Women Offender Sector

Correctional Service Canada

andrea.moser@csc-scc.gc.ca