**CORRECTIONAL SERVICE** CANADA

CHANGING LIVES. PROTECTING CANADIANS.

**Radicalized Offenders and Security Threat Groups: What Do We Know?**

Presentation to the 167th Training Course – UNAFEI
Tokyo, Japan

Correctional Service Canada · Service correctionnel Canada

Dr. Andrea Moser, C.Psych.

Canada

---

# Overview of Presentation

**A. The Correctional Service of Canada**
- Jurisdiction, mission, priorities
- Federal offender population
- Staff profile

**B. Security Threat Groups**
- Myths and realities
- STGs in Canada
- Overview of/research on STGs
- Identifying STGs

**C. Radicalized Offender Research**
- Myths and realities
- Violent Extremism in Canada
- Overview of/research on Radicalized Offenders
- Identifying Radicalized Offenders
- International Best Practices

## Acknowledgement – Information Sources

- It should be noted that much of the material presented in this deck is derived from the Correctional Service of Canada's Parole Officer Continuous Development Training Modules on Security Threat Groups and Radicalized Offenders as well as studies completed by CSC's Research Branch.

## Overview of Correctional Jurisdictions in Canada

- There are 14 correctional jurisdictions in Canada: 1 federal system, 10 provincial systems and 3 territorial systems.

- Provincial and territorial governments have exclusive responsibility for offenders serving less than 2 years, remand, offenders sentenced to probation and young offenders

- Adult offenders (18 years of age and over) sentenced to two or more years are sent to a federal penitentiary

- The federal system is responsible for the supervision of federal offenders in the community, provincial/territorial parolees (except Ontario and Quebec), as well as long term supervision orders.

## Correctional Service Canada (CSC)

### MISSION

*The Correctional Service of Canada, as part of the criminal justice system and respecting the rule of law, contributes to public safety by actively encouraging and assisting offenders to become law-abiding citizens, while exercising reasonable, safe, secure and humane control.*

| Corporate Priorities | |
|---|---|
| Safe management of eligible offenders during their transition from the institution to the community, and while on supervision | Effective and timely interventions in addressing mental health needs of offenders |
| Safety and security of the public, victims, staff and offenders in our institutions and in the community | Efficient and effective management practices that reflect values-based leadership in a changing environment |
| Effective, culturally appropriate interventions and reintegration support for First Nations, Métis and Inuit offenders | Productive relationships with diverse partners, stakeholders, victims' groups, and others involved in support of public safety |

## CSC - Structure

**Responsible for:**
- administering custodial sentences of a term of two years or more, as imposed by the court regardless of offence type;
- managing institutions of various security levels and supervising offenders under conditional release in the community.



**Operates Under:**
- The rule of law, and in particular, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA), which provides its legislative framework

## OVERVIEW

The Correctional Service of Canada in Our Communities
Le Service correctionnel du Canada et nos communautés

➢**Across Canada, 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year, CSC operates:**

-**1** National Headquarters:
   •Ottawa, Ontario

-**5** Regional Headquarters:
   • Atlantic (Moncton), Quebec (Laval), Ontario (Kingston), Prairies (Saskatoon), Pacific (Abbotsford)

-**43** federal institutions (6 for women – includes 1 multi-level Healing Lodge)
   •37 for men – includes 4 minimum-level Healing Lodges)
   •6 Maximum-security (including the Special Handling Unit)
   •9 Medium-security
   •5 Minimum-security
   •12 Multi-level-security, including 5 Regional Treatment Centres
   •11 Clustered *(Effective April 1, 2014, CSC merged 22 institutions on co-located sites into 11 clustered institutions. Each clustered institution is under the leadership of one Institutional Head).*

- **91**  Parole offices and sub-parole offices

- **15** Community Correctional Centres

**175** Community Residential Facilities (owned and operated by Non-Governmental Organizations under contract to provide accommodation and services)

Canada

---

## Federal Offender Population

### OFFENDERS UNDER CSC JURISDICTION:
### TOTAL OF 22,888

2016-17 Average – Corporate Reporting System

*Legend*

| | |
|---|---|
| ■ | In Federal Custody (total of 14,316) |
| ▨ | Under Community Supervision (total of 8,572) |

684

**Women
1,299**

615

**Men
21,589**   |   13, 632   |   7,957

## CSC- Employee Profile

### WORKFORCE – APPROXIMATELY 18,000 EMPLOYEES

CSC's professional workforce ensures the success of our operations and fulfillment of our mandate

#### FRONT-LINE STAFF

| 6,343 Correctional Officers | 460 Correctional Program Officers | 1,274 Parole Officers | 478 Primary Workers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Correctional Officers maintain the safety and security of penitentiaries. They monitor, supervise, and interact with offenders. They search cells, offenders, visitors, vehicles, living units and surrounding areas. | Correctional Program Officers deliver important correctional programs to offenders such as violence prevention and substance abuse programs. They motivate and encourage offenders along the path to successful reintegration. | Parole Officers assess an offender's behaviour, accountability, and potential risk to society. They maintain regular contact with each offender to develop appropriate programming and treatment options, and track their progress. | Primary workers are the main, daily contact for women offenders. They work with colleagues such as parole officers to develop each woman offender's correctional plan, and encourage women offenders to participate in reintegration programs. |
| 151 Aboriginal Officers | 121 Social Program Officers | 865 Nurses | 252 Psychology Staff |
| Aboriginal Liaison/Development Officers provide leadership, cultural awareness, counselling and other services to Indigenous offenders in both institutions and in the community. | Social Program Officers plan, organize, and deliver social programs designed to meet the social, cultural, and personal development needs of offenders. | Nurses are the primary health care providers for offenders, working in clinics located in our institutions. Nurses provide every inmate with essential health care and reasonable access to non-essential mental health care. | Psychologists develop risk assessment tools and contribute to corrections research. They provide psychological screening, assessment, and treatment to offenders. |

#### EMPLOYEES BY REGION

| Pacific 15% | Prairie 24% | Ontario 21% | Quebec 22% | Atlantic 11% | NHQ 7% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

#### EMPLOYEE DIVERSITY

| 47.5% | are women |
|---|---|
| 9.1% | are from a visible minority group |
| 5.2% | are persons with disabilities |
| 9.5% | are Aboriginal Peoples |

## Security Threat Groups

MYTHS AND REALITIES

STGs IN CANADA

OVERVIEW OF/RESEARCH ON STG GROUPS IN CSC

INDICATORS OF MEMBERSHIP IN AN STG

# MYTHS AND REALITIES

## Security Threat Group Misconception VS Reality

**MYTH:**

Security Threat Group members only sell drugs, they don't use them.

**REALITY:**

Research shows that many Security Threat Group members not only are involved in drug trafficking, but they are also users as well. Both alcohol and drug use appear to be an integral and regular part of socializing within gang life

**Security Threat Group Misconception VS Reality**

MYTH:

All Security Threat Groups have a leader and are tightly structured.

REALITY:

Most Security Threat Groups are not tightly structured and in fact are fairly loosely knit groups. They are likely to have one or more leaders, with several others waiting to take over if the current one is killed.

**Security Threat Group Misconception VS Reality**

MYTH:

Females aren't allowed to join gangs.

REALITY:

Although they continue to make up a small proportion of gang members, females are joining gangs and are involved in gang violence.

## Security Threat Group Misconception VS Reality

**MYTH:**

A Security Threat Group always protects its members.

**REALITY:**

While Security Threat Groups can offer protection, it really depends on the person's status within the gang and their usefulness.

---

**STG GROUPS IN CANADA**

OVERVIEW OF SECUIRTY THREAT GROUPS IN CANADA

CURRENT ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES WHICH SECURITY THREAT GROUPS CARRY OUT IN CANADA

OVERVIEW OF SECURITY THREAT GROUPS IN CSC

# Overview of Security Threat Groups in Canada

## What is a Security Threat Group?

The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) identifies a Security Threat Group as any formal or informal ongoing inmate/offender group, gang, organization or association consisting of three or more members.

# Overview of Security Threat Groups in Canada

**Street gangs in Canada are becoming more powerful specifically related to:**

| Violent crime | Inter-gang conflict | Drug trafficking |
| --- | --- | --- |

They range from loosely organized groups involved in low levels of crimes to highly organized groups involved in more sophisticated crimes.

## Overview of Security Threat Groups in Canada

Research findings

According to research done by the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC), gangs are found in smaller cities, rural areas and on Aboriginal reserves.

The amount and types of street gangs in Canada are rising, specifically in Toronto and Montreal. Research has found that in recent years, some trans-national crimes use Canada as their center of operations.

# Overview of Security Threat Groups in CSC

**Prevalence**

- One out of every six male offenders who is newly admitted into custody is affiliated with a STG. For females it is one out of every ten.

- The rate of STG affiliated members entering institutions has been on a steady rise since 1996.

- Quebec and the Prairies have the highest number of STG associations in Canada.

## Overview of Security Threat Groups in CSC

The following table includes 2016 data that represents the number of offenders who have been identified as being affiliated with a Security Threat Group:

|  | ATL | QUE | ONT | PRA | PAC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Women | 0 | 1 | 9 | 23 | 5 |
| Men | 86 | 449 | 475 | 919 | 367 |
| Total | 86 | 450 | 484 | 942 | 372 |

## Overview of Security Threat Groups in CSC

### Recruitment/Reasons for joining a STG

The following are some of the most common reasons as to why individuals join STGs:

- Belonging

- Sense of status and respect

- Security and protection

- Financial opportunities/material gain

- Excitement

- Peer pressure

## Overview of Security Threat Groups in CSC Structure

**Typically a STG has different ranks:**

**Key Player**

**Member**

**Associate**

## Overview of Security Threat Groups in CSC

**According to CSC data, security threat groups usually fall in the following categories:**

- Street Gangs
- Prison Gangs
- Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs
- Traditional Organized Crime
- Aboriginal Gangs
- White Supremacy Groups
- Subversive Groups
- Terrorist Organizations

## Current illegal activities which Security Threat Groups carry out in Canada

**Core criminal areas that are currently active in Canada include:**

- Illicit drugs

- Contraband tobacco

- Child sexual exploitation on the internet

- Human trafficking

- Human smuggling

- Gun Crime and Firearms

**The current illegal activities related to organized crime in Canada are mainly related to:**

- Drug trafficking

- Cybercrime

- Financial crime

## Research - Security Threat Groups

**2010 CSC research found that, compared to a matched sample, criminal organization offenders were significantly more likely to:**

- Come from the province of Quebec;
- Have convictions for drug offences and attempted murder;
- Have high needs in criminal associates and criminal attitudes domains;
- Be low risk and have a high reintegration potential profile; and
- Were significantly less likely to have served a term of youth incarceration.

# IDENTIFYING SECURITY THREAT GROUPS

## Criminal Gangs vs. Organized Crime Groups

Criminal Gangs

Organized Crime Groups

•Identified as a group that is repeatedly involved in criminal activity.

•Some of these groups have been established before imprisonment, others are formed within the institutions.

•Identified as more sophisticated and structured in their criminal activity.

## Key indicators that an offender is affiliated to a Security Threat Group

Since 1996, CSC has been using a specific set of indicators for the identification of gangs and organized crime groups. According to these indicators, an offender may be identified as a member or associate with a Security Threat Group if at least one of the following criteria is met:

- **INDICATOR 1:**  Reliable source identifies the individual as a Security Threat Group member or associate.

- **INDICATOR 2:** Police information provided as a result of observed and ongoing association with other known Security Threat Group member(s) (e.g., via surveillance) indicates the individual is associated with a Security Threat Group.

## Key indicators that an offender is affiliated to a Security Threat Group

- **INDICATOR 3:** Tangible, written, electronic, or photographic evidence states or suggests that the offender is a Security Threat Group member or an associate.

- **INDICATOR 4:** The offender admits membership or association.

- **INDICATOR 5:** The offender is arrested while participating in a criminal activity with known member(s) or associate(s).

- **INDICATOR 6:** Criminal involvement (direct or indirect) in a criminal organization activity

- **INDICATOR 7:** A judicial finding that the individual is a member or an associate.

- **INDICATOR 8:** The presence of common and/or symbolic identification, tattoos, or paraphernalia.

# A note on reliable sources ...

A reliable source may include: an inside gang member or rival gang member; legitimate community or institutional resources such as schools, business, or citizens.

# Key indicators that an offender is affiliated to a Security Threat Group

**Signs to Watch for**

Below are some signs identified by CSC to watch for that may signify association with a Security Threat Group.

- Use of hand signs to communicate with others.

- Possession of money or items that can't be explained.

- Unexplained injuries – potentially from initiation rituals and/or gang violence.

- Unusual handwriting or graffiti on personal items such as notebooks or papers.

- Marking gang symbols on themselves (this may precede tattoos of those symbols).

**CONTINUED...**

## Key indicators that an offender is affiliated to a Security Threat Group

- Use of gang slang.

- Use of nicknames.

- Frequently late for class or misses class altogether.

- Sudden changes in behaviour – for example, the offender who used to participate, share personal experiences and ask questions.

- Change in attitude – overtly suspicious or hostile attitude toward participating in anything to do with CSC.

- Change in friends – starts hanging around people that have a negative influence on them. This will often coincide with poorer program performance and/or a negative attitude; they may be involved in fights and/or other institutional incidents.          **CONTINUED...**

## Key indicators that an offender is affiliated to a Security Threat Group

- Breaking curfew / obligations – In the community, you may notice they start breaking curfew and fail to show up for programs and appointments.

- Wearing accessories that denote gang membership – bandannas, jewellery, belt buckles, key chains are all commonly used to signify membership.

- Colours – various colours may be signs of gang association, however, those with affiliations will often wear the same colour(s) continuously.

- Carrying photographs – some offenders with affiliations will carry photographs of other gang members.

## Key indicators that an offender is affiliated to a Security Threat Group

**Responsivity Issues to Watch for**

**Below are some of the main responsivity issues identified by CSC to be aware of when working with known or suspected members of a Security Threat Group.**

- **ISSUE 1: Power and control issues –** offenders with Security Threat Group affiliations may have difficulty with someone else 'running the show.'

- **ISSUE 2: Manipulation –** offenders with gang affiliations may try to manipulate staff.

- **ISSUE 3: Corruption –** offenders with gang affiliations may try to corrupt staff, which can occur in a variety of ways.

- **ISSUE 4: Infiltration –** offenders with gang affiliations may try to infiltrate.

- **ISSUE 5: Trust issues –** gang members and associates may have difficulty trusting staff.

# Radicalized Offenders

**MYTHS AND REALITIES**

⬇

**VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN CANADA**

⬇

**IDENTIFYING RADICALIZATION**

⬇

**RESEARCH ON RADICALIZED OFFENDERS**

⬇

**INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES**

## Misconceptions

- Violent extremism and terrorism is criminally motivated.

- There is an easily identifiable profile or persons that become radical extremists/terrorist.

- Religion is the cause of terrorism.

- Prisons are a hotbed/breeding ground of radicalization.

- De-radicalization is necessary to effectively manage the risk posed by violent extremists.

## Radicalization to Violence

- Radicalization is the process by which "individuals (or groups) are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs toward extreme views".

- The *Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)* defines the term radical as "a person who wishes to effect fundamental political, economic or social change, or change from the ground up".

## Violent Extremism

- Radical thinking associated to the peaceful promotion of ideas that challenge the prevailing status quo have promoted significant and progressive social change throughout history. Malcolm X, Ghandi and Angela Davis are examples of people who brought about great change through peaceful means.

- While radical thinking is not a problem in itself, it becomes a threat to national security when individuals promote or engage in violence as a means of furthering their radical political, ideological or religious views.

- Radicalization to violence rejects the fundamental principles of both law and democracy. It may manifest in any ethno-cultural or religious context and be driven by a whole range of ideologies or causes.

## How individuals become radicalized

- The issue of radicalization leading to violence is complex. Therefore, there is no simple explanation or consensus about a typical pathway to radicalization leading to violence.

- However, researchers and security services worldwide have proposed various models to better define specific trajectories.

- These often include what are called 'Push and Pull' Factors of negative engagement and pro-social disengagement (i.e. Protective Factors).

- Some of the key driving forces include feelings of injustice, lack of recognition, identity crisis, stigmatization, discrimination and marginalization.

## How individuals become radicalized

- The Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading To Violence (CPRLV) in Montréal have developed and designed an informative diagram illustrating the complex, multi-dimensional process of radicalization leading to violence.

CENTRE FOR THE PREVENTION
OF RADICALIZATION
LEADING TO VIOLENCE

# Terrorism in Canada

- *Public Safety Canada's* 2014 Public Report On The Terrorist Threat To Canada, states that terrorism remains the leading threat to Canada's national security. In the past few decades, several hundred Canadian civilians have been killed or injured in terrorist attacks.

- A number of international and domestic terrorist groups are present in Canada. Some are engaged in terrorist activity here, while others are active beyond Canada's borders.



**54 LISTED TERRORIST ENTITIES**
IN CANADA

Listing an entity is a way to publicly identify a group or individual associated with terrorism.

**DID YOU KNOW?**

CSC's Public Safety Portfolio partners, the RCMP and CSIS are mandated with the National Security responsibility of protecting Canada and its citizens from acts of terrorism.

**AMERICAS (6)**
17. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)
21. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
23. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
30. International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy – Canada (IRFAN)
51. Sendero Luminoso (SL)
54. World Tamil Movement (WTM)

**EUROPE (2)**
20. Caucasus Emirate
22. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)

**AFRICA (9)**
05. Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (AGAI)
06. Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI)
07. Al-Muwaqi'un Bil Dima
08. Al-Murabitoun
11. Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
12. Al Shabaab
14. Armed Islamic Group (AIG)
19. Boko Haram
46. Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA)

**MIDDLE EST (28)**
01. Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
02. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
04. Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (AAMB)
09. Al Qaida
10. Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
13. Ansar al-Islam (AI)
15. Asbat Al-Ansar (AAA) ("The League of Partisans")
24. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
25. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Faction of the Hezb-e Islami, Hezb-e Islam Gulbuddin (HIG)
26. Hamas (Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya) ("Islamic Resistance Movement")
27. Haqqani Network
28. Harakat ul-Mudjahidin (HuM)
29. Hizballah
32. Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)
34. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Qods Force
35. Islamic State
36. Islamic State – Sinai Province (ISSP)
37. Jabhat Al-Nusra
38. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
39. Jaysh Al-Muhajirin Wal-Ansar (JMA)
41. Kahane Chai (KACH)
42. Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
43. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)
47. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
48. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
49. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
50. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC)
52. Taliban

**ASIA (9)**
03. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
16. Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)
18. Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)
31. International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)
33. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
40. Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI)
44. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)
45. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
53. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

# Identifying Radicalization

## Identifying a radicalized individual

- Radicalization is not limited to any single group, social class, religion, culture, ethnicity, age group or worldview. There is not one single profile or linear path.

- However, there are certain behaviours or indicators that suggest that some individuals (or groups) may be more susceptible than others to becoming radicalized or adopting violent extremist ideologies.

## How to identify a radicalized individual

- The Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading To Violence (CPRLV) in Montréal has developed the "Behaviour Barometer". Designed as an education and awareness tool, the "Behaviour Barometer" identifies how to differentiate between behaviours that are cause for concern and those that are not.

## Radicalized Offenders in CSC

- Radicalization is not a new phenomenon to CSC as these types of offenders have been in our care at various times over the last 150 years. This is also the case for many jurisdictions around the world.

- Some examples of extremist offenders and groups that have served sentences with CSC and pre-date the Anti-Terrorism act include: the Doukhobors, the Squamish Five, Armenian Nationalists, Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ), and the Jamaat ul-Fuqra.

- While our *Public Safety* colleagues are specifically mandated to detect, prevent and prosecute those who commit acts of terrorism and violent extremism, CSC is chiefly responsible with a wholly different responsibility: the management, supervision and rehabilitation of those convicted of such crimes.

## Caveat ...

- Indicators and factors provided in this presentation are for reference purposes only, and do not definitively claim direct causation to radicalization or violent extremism. Professional judgment, objectivity and discretion, on a case-by-case basis, need be exercised in all circumstances.

- As with all human behaviour, changes are open to interpretation. For that reason, it is important not to make judgement on the presence of one indicator, rather looking for a "cluster" or pattern of changes. It is of critical importance that signs be considered in context.

- The presence of any of the indicators referenced within this presentation, on their own, do not necessarily indicate a threat of criminal activity; however, the likelihood increases as more indicators are present.

- The indicators provided are equally applicable to all types of ideologically motivated extremist violence.

- A correctional service's ability to accurately identify persons involved in violent extremism and those at risk of being radicalized, will allow it to effectively triage these cases from a security risk mitigation perspective and determine an appropriate intervention/ security case management strategy.

## Radicalized offenders in CSC

- CSC's defines a radicalized offender as "ideologically motivated offender, who commits, aspires, or conspires to commit, or promotes violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives."

- CSC's definition of radicalized offenders does not focus on any specific ethnic or cultural group or religious denomination, recognizing that radicalized offenders can be involved in a wide range of behaviours and activities that support extreme political, religious or ideological purposes, objectives or causes (including global jihad, terrorist financing, or extreme political militantism).

- It is important to note that there are other offenders currently in the federal correctional system that meet CSC's definition of a radicalized offender but who were not convicted of terrorism-related offences.

## CSC's identification processes

1. Convicted of Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) offences

2. Identified by partners or third party agencies: Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), Ontario Provincial Police – Provincial Anti-Terrorism Squad (OPP-PATS), etc.

3. Identified internally by CSC:
   ➤ Via established Security and Case Management intake and review processes
   ➤ Staff observational reporting

## Radicalized Offenders in CSC – At a Glance

- As of July 1st, 2017, there were 15 offenders serving federal sentences under CSC's jurisdiction on terrorism-related offences – 14 in federal institutions and one under community supervision.

- Sentences for these offenders range from four years to life.

- CSC's radicalized offender population presently represents a very small fraction of those persons identified as belonging to a Security Threat Group (STG).

- However, this population poses a unique threat to CSC, our departmental responsibilities, and the safety and security of our staff and offender population.

## Radicalized Offender Research at CSC

**The Research Branch (CSC):**

- Part of Policy Sector

- applied program of research

- forward-thinking, innovative, and targets critical correctional issues

- multi-disciplinary teams, multi-method approaches

- engages/collaborates with internal and external partners

## Radicalized Offender Research: Background and Purpose

- Canadians have been victim to acts or threats of violent extremism from a variety of groups who hold ideologies involving religious, political, and revolutionary doctrine (Crelinsten, 2012)

- A critical need for more quantitative data with regards to violent extremism in Canada has been identified (Borum, 2011; Public Safety Canada, 2011)

- There have been calls for more research to occur to understand radicalization within prisons (Pluchinksy, 2008; Wilner & Crowley, 2011)

## Background and Purpose Continued…

- **2012/13: CSC's Research Branch undertook a research study on violent extremists (radicalized offenders) in federal institutions in an effort to:**

  - gain an understanding of data sources and gaps;
  - contribute to the level of knowledge surrounding violent extremists in Canada; and
  - inform CSC institutional operations, policies, and procedures

- **Results led to a multi-year (2013/14 – 2015/16) research initiative aiming to:**

  - obtain evidence-based knowledge to inform effective assessment, intervention, and management strategies for radicalized offenders or those deemed susceptible to radicalization

## Research Questions

1. What can we learn from examining radicalized offenders under CSC's jurisdiction, as well as those susceptible to radicalization?

2. What can we learn from other correctional systems that have experience in managing radicalized offenders?

3. How can we integrate these research findings into evidence-based policy and practice at CSC?

## Violent extremists in federal custody

**Study 1:**
*A Qualitative Examination of Radicalization and Susceptibility to Radicalization*

## Study 1:

### Methodological Approaches

- Focus groups with CSC staff

- Empirical comparison of radicalized offenders and the non-radicalized general offender population on:

  - Literature-based theoretical characteristics;
  - Characteristics identified in focus groups;
  - Other available intake and custody-related information

- Coding of offender files to obtain information on motivations (ideological and non-ideological) and needs (criminogenic or other violent extremist)

- International roundtable and consultation questionnaire

## Focus groups with CSC staff
### Results/Findings

| Most frequently mentioned behaviours/indicators | Other behaviours/indicators | Two distinct subsets of susceptible offenders were established: |
|---|---|---|
| Possessing certain books or materials | Attempts to recruit new members | Offenders who were deemed vulnerable, unattached, and unskilled— recruited to conduct the day to day "dirty work" of the group. |
| Exhibiting a change in institutional associations | Increase in filing of formal grievances | |
| Having ideological arguments with staff members or other inmates | Changes in physical appearances | Offenders who were more connected, educated and skilled— recruited for their specific skills and abilities. |
| Congregating in specific areas or participating in informal prayers sessions | | |

Stys, Y., Gobeil, R., Harris, A. J. R., & Michel, S. (2014). Violent extremists in federal institutions: *Estimating radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization in the federal offender population*. (Research Report R-313). Ottawa, ON: Correctional Service of Canada.

# Research Findings

**Susceptibility to radicalization in the correctional realm:**

- Though concern over the spread of violent ideologies has been expressed, this concern is supported by limited qualitative, anecdotal evidence

- Researchers have concluded that many of those who adopt extremist ideologies in prison often disregard these beliefs upon release

- However, a greater understanding of susceptibility while incarcerated is still required

## Violent extremists in federal custody

### Study 2:
*Comparisons of Radicalized and Non-Radicalized Federal Offenders*

---

### Study 2:
#### Comparisons of Radicalized and Non-Radicalized Federal Offenders

- CSC indentified and compared the differences between radicalized offenders and the mainstream offender population.

- As a group, radicalized offenders frequently differed from their non-radicalized counterparts.

**Results/findings**

- Younger
- No criminal history
- Educated
- Better employment histories
- Better adjustment in terms of mental health and institutional behaviour
- Less likely to be Canadian citizens, more likely to be of a visible minority group
- Fewer problems with the abuse of alcohol and other drugs
- Less frequently assessed as presenting high levels of criminogenic need or low levels of community reintegration potential

## Needs and Motivations of Radicalized Offenders



**Motivations**

- ◨ Purely Ideological Motives
- ◨ Purely Criminal Motives
- ◨ Both

30%
53%
17%

- Most common ideological motivations: desire for political change, desire to respond to a group grievance

- A high proportion of radicalized offenders had needs in the associates, attitudes, and personal/emotional domains and a low proportion had needs in the areas of substance abuse and community functioning

- When ideologically-motivated offenders were examined separately, the needs results were more pronounced, indicating that perhaps the needs and motivations of non-ideologically motivated radicalized offenders are more similar to those found in the non-radicalized, general offender population.

## Research Results Profile Summary
### CSC's Radicalized Offenders



**Radicalized Offender**

**Profile**
- Younger
- No criminal history
- Limited mental health needs
- More educated and employable

**Needs**
- Associates
- Attitudes
- Personal/emotional

**Motivations**
- 30% purely ideological
- 17% purely criminal
- 53% both ideological and criminal

Stys, Y., Gobeil, R., Harris, A. J. R., & Michel, S. (2014). Violent extremists in federal institutions: *Estimating radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization in the federal offender population*. (Research Report R-313). Ottawa, ON: Correctional Service of Canada.; Stys, Y. & Michel, S. (2014). *Examining the Needs and Motivations of Canada's Federally Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders*. (Research Report R-344). Ottawa, ON: Correctional Service of Canada.

## Radicalized Offender Research

- While the gains in this area have been significant, there is international recognition that the field of research related to radicalization and violent extremism is in its relative infancy, and that significant work remains outstanding.

- CSC's Research Branch continues to build upon recent advancements in regards to radicalized offender research, policy, and procedure; while addressing a number of the internationally-recognized areas in need of additional evidence.

- The applicability of a radicalized offender management strategy is presently being considered in ongoing research coupled with international consultation on this specific population of offenders.

**Want to know more about CSC's Radicalized Offenders research?**

Contact the Research Branch at
research@csc-scc.gc.ca

## CSC Research Results:
## International Best Practices

1. **Sharing of intelligence information**
   - collaborative, open, and reciprocal
   - at all points of offender management (pre-sentence, incarceration, and post-release)

2. **Provision of staff training**
   - what radicalization is, when it is problematic, how to identify it
   - responsibilities in terms of reporting and/or intervention

3. **Accommodation strategies**
   - aim to fully integrate and separate when security risk necessitates
   - identification and control of key radicalizing influences is essential

## International Best Practices Continued...

**4. Disengagement rather than de-radicalization**
- focus of intervention is to change behaviour, not ideology
- requires an understanding of the factors that motivate radicals to violent action (i.e., identity)

**5. Radicalized offenders have unique needs**
- understanding unique needs = effective management
- approaches vary (specialized vs. standard risk/needs assessments)

**6. More evidence is required**
- effectiveness of assessments and interventions
- community reintegration and reoffending

## UNODC Handbook

- Developed by expert working group in 2015/2016; published in December, 2016
- CSC contributed through participation in the expert working group
- Comprehensive guide aimed at providing technical guidance on this topic to member states

## Additional Lectures

- *Management of Radicalized Offenders and Security Threat Groups in a Correctional Context*

- *Gender and Cultural Considerations in the Management of Offenders (including STGs)*

## Questions and Discussion

**For more information**:
Andrea Moser, Ph.D., C.Psych.
Director General, Women Offender Sector
Correctional Service Canada

*andrea.moser@csc-scc.gc.ca*